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The article offers an analysis of the potential impact of the Community Work Programme (CWP) on crime and 
violence. The CPW is a public employment programme that was formally established within the government 
in 2010. The CWP may have an impact on crime and violence through a number of different ‘pathways’. One 
of these, the focus of this article, is through wages provided to the participants, 75% of whom are women. 
Notable here is the likely impact of these wages on the households of participants, including on their children 
and intimate partner relations. Whereas the CWP may have a beneficial impact on children in a household, 
there appears to be the potential that the CWP may aggravate the risk of violence, particularly for female 
participants who have unemployed partners. The article argues that if the crime prevention potential of the CWP 
is to be optimised, this motivates for providing ‘gender training’ to participants who may be at risk of intimate 
partner violence. In addition, limited male participation may reinforce a pattern of male exclusion, motivating for 
increasing the participation of men within the CWP.  
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Public employment programmes (PEPs) have 
been established in many countries. Often called 
public works programmes, they are typically 
established as a response to high levels of poverty 
and unemployment. Historically the PEPs that are 
most well-known are the programmes that were 
established in the United States as part of the 
Roosevelt administration’s New Deal during the 
years of the Great Depression of the 1930s.1 Current 
examples of PEPs internationally include the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in India and 
the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia.2   
PEPs are established as a state response to poverty 
and unemployment. Their primary purpose is not to 
address crime or violence. Nevertheless, it is widely 
believed that job creation does reduce crime,3 and 
for this reason there may be a tendency to assume 
that PEPs may also do so. However, it is important 
to keep in mind that assessing or discussing the 
impact of PEPs on crime and violence4 should be 
approached with caution, since addressing crime 
and violence is not inherently more important than 
INsTITuTe foR seCuRITy sTuDIes26
the primary social goals of PEPs, namely to reduce 
poverty and unemployment.5 Thus, assessments 
of PEPs should primarily focus on their impact on 
poverty and unemployment, with other effects, for 
instance on crime, health or education,6 regarded as 
possible secondary outcomes. Nevertheless, since 
PEPs affect many thousands, or even millions, of 
participants, their ‘secondary outcomes’ may be of 
considerable significance. It is therefore worthwhile 
to deepen our understanding of how to assess these 
outcomes as well. 
This article focuses on a specific South African 
PEP, the Community Work Programme (CWP). The 
possible impact of the CWP, on intimate partner 
violence, collective violence and crime more generally, 
has been raised by other authors.7 The CWP is of 
particular interest in terms of its potential impact on 
crime prevention, partly because, unlike some other 
PEPs in South Africa, it involves people from poor 
communities working within their own communities. 
The article explores the possible impact of the 
CWP on crime and violence as a consequence of 
the wages paid to participants. It argues that the 
mechanism by which CWP wages have an impact 
on crime and violence is likely to be shaped by the 
gender and age profile of the participants in the CWP. 
The article emphasises that the provision of work and 
wages should only be considered as one of the set 
of possible pathways through which the CWP may 
affect crime and violence. 
This article draws on material from research on the 
CWP undertaken by the Centre for the Study of 
Violence and Reconciliation. The research, carried 
out between August 2013 and March 2015, involved 
in-depth interviews with participants and community 
members at six CWP sites in Gauteng, the Western 
Cape and North West, as well as with other CWP 
role players, including representatives of national, 
provincial and local government, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) that have been appointed as 
CWP implementing agents, and policy experts with 
knowledge of the CWP. 
The Community Work Programme
PEPs were first established by the post-apartheid 
government in the late 1990s. However, the 
most significant PEP, the Expanded Public Works 
Programme (EPWP), was officially launched in May 
2004.8 The CWP is an off-shoot of the EPWP and 
was established partly on the basis of an assessment 
of the impact of the first phase of the EPWP. 
This assessment noted in particular that EPWP 
programmes were ‘mainly designed to offer a short-
term episode of full-time work’ that was ‘expected to 
facilitate entry into the wider labour market’ but that 
‘many participants exited back into poverty instead’.9
The CWP was established in recognition of the fact 
that unemployment in South Africa is structural.10 
This means that, even if there are consistent 
improvements in the South African economy, 
unemployment is likely to remain a major ongoing 
problem in the medium to long term. It also means 
that, as a result of the nature of the labour market, 
government programmes that provide people with 
work experience and skills will not automatically 
enable them to establish their own businesses or 
find employment. 
Unlike the EPWP, the work opportunities in the CWP 
are not short-term. The idea that CWP participants 
may exit the CWP to take up work opportunities or 
establish their own businesses is regarded favourably, 
and the CWP does indeed enhance the ability of 
some participants to do this.11 But it cannot be 
assumed that participants will be able to do this 
is, nor is it a primary objective of the programme. 
Due to the fact that it provides long-term stable 
work opportunities, the support that is provided by 
the CWP differs from that provided by the EPWP.12 
The CWP also has a number of other features that 
distinguish it from the EPWP, and from many other 
PEPs internationally.13 
The CWP was initiated as a pilot programme in 2007. 
Since 2010 it has been located in the Department 
of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs 
(COGTA).14 According to COGTA data, the CWP 
provided 202 599 jobs in the April 2014 to March 
2015 year and was operating at 186 sites around 
the country in April 2015.15 Government has also 
announced that it intends extending the CWP to all 
local municipalities in the country.16 
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The CWP and crime and 
violence prevention 
Questions relating to the impact of the CWP on 
violence were previously raised in a paper about 
one of the pilot sites that was established in North 
West province. This paper concluded that the CWP 
had played a decisive role in preventing conflict and 
violence in that community.17 It has also been argued 
that the CWP is likely to prevent violence and crime 
where CWP activities are specifically targeted at this, 
in other words, where the participants are doing work 
that is intended to prevent crime and violence, such 
as patrolling neighbourhoods.18 
We can think about the potential impact of the CWP 
on crime and violence at each site in terms of the 
‘nett’ or cumulative effect of a number of different 
‘pathways’. These include: 
•	 The	impact	of	the	‘useful	work’	activities	that	CWP	
participants perform. A core part of the CWP 
framework is that it should do ‘useful work’, which 
is defined as that which contributes ‘to the public 
good, community goods or social services’.19 At 
some sites participants are involved in activities 
that are directly aimed at enhancing safety, such 
as community patrols.20 Other activities, such as 
support for Early Childhood Development (ECD) 
programmes, may enhance primary prevention 
(activities that aim to ‘address potentially 
criminogenic factors before the onset of the 
problem’).21 (See also SACQ 51, a special edition 
on primary violence prevention.) 
•	 Impact	at	the	level	of	‘community’	(sometimes	
also called ‘neighbourhood effects’).22 The CWP is 
‘community focused’ in a manner which the EPWP 
is not. Participants work alongside other community 
members, doing work that is intended to benefit 
their own community. The types of work undertaken 
are also supposed to be identified in consultation 
with that community. The CWP is regarded as a 
vehicle for ‘unlocking community agency’23 and 
strengthening social capital.24 Thus the CWP may 
enhance the disposition or willingness of community 
members to take collective or individual action to 
advance community interests, including order and 
control within the community. Known as collective 
efficacy, this has been identified as significant in 
explaining differences in levels of crime between 
communities that share similar socio-economic 
characteristics and might otherwise be expected 
to have similar levels of crime.25   
•	 The	CPW	is	a	government	programme	in	which	
major public resources are invested. In this respect 
therefore, the CWP increases the risk of crime 
and the abuse of public resources, whether this 
is in the form of the theft of CWP equipment, 
corruption by employees, or the manipulation of 
the CWP by politicians in the service of systems of 
patronage. The ‘nett’ impact of the CWP on crime 
will therefore also be influenced by the degree to 
which the CWP has effective integrity systems, 
such as systems of financial management, as well 
as by the willingness and ability of CWP personnel 
to withstand inappropriate political interference.    
This article focuses on a fourth ‘pathway’: the impact 
of the CWP as a mass employment programme 
that offers large numbers of people work and 
wages. Once established at a site, the CWP can 
be regarded as a local institution that forms part of 
the mix of institutions – hospitals, schools, formal or 
informal businesses, etc. – in that area. In common 
with many of these institutions, the CWP provides 
regular and ongoing work and income to people 
within the area. Due to the fact that it employs in the 
region of 1 000, and sometimes more, people at a 
site, the number of people employed by the CWP is 
often much greater than the number employed by 
other institutions in the area.  
If it is true that providing people with employment 
and an income contributes to reducing crime and 
violence, it might be assumed that the CWP, as 
a programme that provides these opportunities 
‘at scale’ in the areas in which it is established, 
will contribute to reducing crime and violence in a 
significant way. However, in assessing whether this 
is the case it is necessary to recognise that these 
job opportunities are largely accessed by women 
rather than by young men, who tend to be the main 
participants in crime and violence.26 
In examining questions about the impact of the CWP 
on violence, the article does not assume that crime 
and violence are uniform phenomena. The main 
forms of crime or violence referred to in this article 
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are property crime and intimate partner (domestic) 
violence against women. 
The income ‘safety net’ 
provided by the CWP  
Though the CWP also has broader ‘community 
development’ objectives, its core objective is to 
provide an income ‘safety net’ to the ‘poorest of the 
poor’.27 At CWP sites, participants may do two days 
of work per week, up to a total of 100 days per year, 
and are paid a wage of R76 per day (the current rate 
as of March 2015). This amounts to around R608 per 
month, which by some standards is quite low,28 but 
is consistent with the objective to target those who 
are most in need, and for whom the small income 
provided by the CWP will be of appreciable benefit. 
Furthermore, the work provided by the CWP is 
explicitly intended to be part time. 
The CWP enables participants to depend on a small 
but stable income and use the additional time they 
have to engage in other income-earning activity, 
or to look for other work. Incomes from the CWP 
may be used to supplement social grants, which, 
subject to a means test, are available inter alia to 
mothers or other primary caregivers of children under 
the age of 18, people with disabilities, and elderly 
people. In addition, the intention behind the CWP is 
to extend state support beyond the ranks of those 
who are eligible for social grants, and in so doing 
to compensate for the ‘lack of social protection 
interventions that target the working age poor’.29  
The profile of participants in the CWP 
The areas in which the CWP has been established 
are characterised by high levels of unemployment.30 
However, not all unemployed people want to work 
in the CWP. A consistent pattern across CWP 
sites in different regions is that women of 35 and 
over constitute the largest group of participants. 
As reflected in row A of Table 1, in January 2015 
women in this age group accounted for 42% of all 
participants nationally. Women between the ages 
of 18–34 constitute the second biggest group of 
participants, accounting for 33% of participants.  
After these two groups men of 35 and over typically 
account for the third biggest group, with young men 
being the least likely to participate. 
The demand for positions in the CWP appears to 
be much higher among women over the age of 35 
than among younger women. A similar pattern also 
applies to older men, who outnumber younger men. 
This runs contrary to what might be expected, since 
youth unemployment in South Africa is exceptionally 
high.31 The most striking differences, however, 
are not those between older and younger people 
but between women and men. There is a relative 
absence of men, notably of young men, within the 
programme. Furthermore, as reflected in row C (Table 
1), young men are less likely than any of the other 
groups to remain in the CWP for extended periods 
of time. Almost half (45%) of young men who were 
in the CWP had been in the programme for less 
than a year. It seems reasonable to assume that the 
reasons for people leaving include relocating, finding 
better job opportunities, and that they ‘don’t like the 
 
Female Male 
Total 
partici-
pants
Non-
youth 
(35 and 
over) 
Youth 
(34 and 
under)  
Non-
youth 
(35 and 
over) 
Youth 
(34 and 
under) 
A: All 
participants 
April 2014 – 
March 2015 
85 440 66 987 26 955 23 217 202 599
Percentage 42.2% 33.1% 13.3% 11.5% 100%
B: Long-term 
participants 
(received 
wages in 
both April 
2014 and 
March 2015)
64 736 42 588 19 232 12 753 139 309
Percentage 46.5% 30.6% 13.8% 9.2% 100%
C: Long-term 
participants 
(row B) as a 
percentage 
of all partici-
pants in this 
category 
(row A)
75.8% 63.6% 71.3% 54.9% 68.8%
Table 1:  Profile of CWP participants and duration 
 of participation, April 2014–March 2015
Source: Analysis by author of data provided by Community 
Work Programme, Department of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs, April 2015
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CWP’.32  There is currently no data to determine which 
of these factors are most significant in accounting for 
the relatively short duration of participation by many 
young men in the programme. As compared to older 
women and men, young women are also apparently 
more likely to join the CWP on a relatively short-term 
basis, with 36% of female participants in the under-35 
category having been in the CWP for less than a year. 
Could the reason for the differences between levels 
of female and male participation in the CWP be 
that more women are unemployed? In the fourth 
quarter of 2014, 49.2% of men were classified as 
employed, as opposed to 36.9% of women (Table 2). 
However, statistics on people looking for work, who 
are classified as unemployed, and ‘discouraged job 
seekers’ who have not recently taken active steps to 
look for work,33 indicate little gender difference in the 
two categories. 
As can be seen in Table 2, the number of women 
in the combined ‘unemployed’ and ‘discouraged’ 
categories (3 690 000) only marginally exceeds the 
number of men (3 622 000). It is only when both 
the ‘unemployed’ and the ‘not economically active’ 
categories are added together that the number of 
women significantly exceeds the number of men. If the 
‘unemployed’ and the ‘not economically active’ are 
added together, women make up roughly 56% and 
men 44% of this population of 20 324 000 people. If 
levels of participation in the CWP were similar to the 
gender profile of the latter group of people then the 
differences within the CWP would presumably reflect 
this 56% to 44% ratio, rather than the 75% women to 
25% men ratio currently reflected in the CWP.  
Gender and age-related factors 
impacting on participation in the CWP
The above statistics suggest that there are other 
gender and age-related factors that have an impact 
on the demand for positions in the CWP. Research at 
CWP sites carried out during 2013 and 2014 
indicates that there are an inter-connected set 
of factors that are relevant to understanding 
this. A widespread perception among female 
participants was that women have a greater sense of 
responsibility to provide for children and other family 
members than men do. Many women are motivated 
to take on work in the CWP, despite the low wages, 
in order to be able to care for children – often using 
this to supplement the government child support 
grant (CSG).  
When children cry because they want food they 
cry to their mothers and we feel the pain if we 
cannot provide for them. As a mother it’s even 
more difficult when you are raising children alone 
with no help from the father of your children 
and you are forced to work in order to provide 
for them.  ... I have no support at all from the 
family of my late husband and rely on the grant 
I receive from government. It’s difficult because 
the grant is very small so with the CWP money I 
am able to make ends meet.35     
One explanation for the low levels of participation 
by men was that that they were irresponsible or 
lazy. Some female interviewees at CWP sites and 
at least one government official suggested that the 
lack of interest in the programme could essentially 
 
Economically active  Not economically active
TotalWorking Unemployed Discouraged job 
seekers
Other not 
economically 
active 
Women 6 676 2 414 1 276 7 727 18 093
Percentage 36.9% 13.4% 7.1% 42.7% 100%
Men 8 643 2 495 1 127 5 285 17 550
Percentage 49.2% 14.2% 6.4% 30.1% 100%
Table 2:  Percentage of men and women of working age (15–64) in South Africa who are working, 
 unemployed and not economically active, 4th quarter 2014 (in thousands) 
Source: Statistics South Africa34
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be attributed to laziness.36 Other interviewees also 
observed that young people, and particularly young 
men, were often a difficult constituency to recruit 
to PEPs. Many of them struggle to adapt to work 
environments, whether in the CWP or elsewhere. As 
a result, many of the big private sector companies 
require young people to participate in ‘work 
readiness’ programmes in order to be considered 
for employment.37    
Wages are obviously also a factor affecting 
participation in the CWP. Especially when women 
receive one or more CSGs, the money that they get 
from the CWP contributes to a modest, but more 
satisfactory income. For men, on the other hand, the 
CWP wages are likely to be their only state-provided 
income. Paradoxically, some interviewees suggested 
that it was partly their sense of responsibility to their 
families that led men to reject CWP opportunities, 
as the CWP income alone would not enable them to 
provide for their families. 
R540, No! No! Thinking that he is supposed to 
support children, three children, he also has to 
maintain himself. That R500 is little for him. But 
one thing for sure, a woman can do a lot with 
that R500. I think that is the reason. He says 
R500 is little, it cannot maintain my children.38  
The majority of men moved out because they 
need other jobs. [This is because] men need 
more money to feed the family. A woman does 
not care. As long she supports her children 
she does not have a problem, she is going to 
stay there. She [also] gets extra support from 
the social grants, but a man cannot live on 
that little money [he only gets from CWP]. He 
has to go back to the house and buy groceries 
for the children.39   
Nevertheless, the reluctance of unemployed men, 
and particularly young men, to take up positions in 
the CWP remains puzzling. Besides the fact that 
men are generally not eligible for social grants,40 they 
often have few alternative economic opportunities, 
even if they do have marketable skills. They often 
appear to reject the CWP not because they have 
better economic opportunities elsewhere, but 
despite the fact that these are not available to them. 
In one study the income-earning opportunities 
open to young men in informal settlements are 
described as ‘poorly paid and highly precarious’, 
such as ‘temporary formal work (primarily shop work 
or construction), informal work (such as selling small 
items at the side of the road or working on public 
taxis), or a variety of illegal activities (selling drugs or 
petty crime)’ with many of the men also relying ‘on 
their family to support them financially’.41 
It appears that concerns about social status, 
reflecting the links between gender, work and 
personal identity, may go some way towards 
explaining this anomaly. One feature of the CWP 
at many sites is that a significant proportion of 
participants do work that involves cleaning streets 
and other public areas, including places that have 
been used as dumping grounds. Even though CWP 
work may be fairly diverse, the aspect of CWP work 
that is physically most visible to other community 
members is often cleaning work. Within many 
households, work of this kind is typically performed 
by women.42 As a result, work in the CWP may be 
seen as low status ‘women’s work’. Home-based 
care or other care work might also tend to be 
regarded as women’s work. Men often seem unwilling 
to work in the CWP when the type of work being 
done does not align with their own views on the types 
of work that men should do and be seen doing.
This is borne out by the the number of men 
participating in other EPWP programmes. Even 
though EPWP wage rates are the same as those for 
the CWP, the proportion of men in the infrastructure 
sector (49%) and environment sector (47%) is 
relatively large. These sectors are likely to involve 
much more work that is considered traditionally 
masculine. On the other hand, in the ‘social sector’, 
which involves more ‘care’ type activities, men make 
up only 15% of participants.43 Also, though work 
in the EPWP is paid at the same daily rates, in the 
construction sector the work is often offered for more 
days of the week and month, even if the projects are 
of relatively short duration. For the short period of 
time in which they are involved in the EPWP, men are 
thus likely to receive a higher monthly wage than they 
would receive in the CWP. While this might account 
for higher levels of participation by men in the EPWP 
construction sector, one of the factors discouraging 
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male participation in the CWP appears to be the 
gendered nature of the work offered. 
In the research at CWP sites, male reluctance 
to participate in the CWP was often viewed as 
reflecting a male view that they would be lowering 
themselves by participating in the CWP; a view 
referred to as ‘pride’. 
There are more women than men in this 
project because women are used to house 
work and cleaning and they love working. Men 
are very few in this project because of pride.  
Men have pride even when they have nothing. 
Men will be very shy to work the kind of work 
we do in the CWP like cleaning the streets and 
cleaning the schools.44    
I think men have pride as there are lots of men 
who are unemployed and they say the money 
is too little. Women have no option because 
they have kids that they have to support. 
Unemployed men do not want to 
join because the money is very little although 
they too have the same responsibilities to raise 
their children. Men generally do not want to 
work for little money, they want more money 
even when they do not have the qualification 
or the experience.45   
Some interviewees expressed a concern that they 
would be ridiculed by others if they joined the 
CWP, with participation in the CWP signifying that 
they have ‘given up’ on making something more of 
their lives.
What will my peers say when they see me 
wearing the orange overall and cleaning the 
streets of Kagiso? Maybe I can do this type 
of a job in another township but never in 
Kagiso where I live. I will be a laughing stock 
among my peers and my community. This 
is not the type of work to be done by young 
people. If I had to do this job it means that I 
will be surrendering in life that I have failed and 
reached a dead end. This is not an inspiring 
job even for us who are unemployed. How do 
I work the whole day for just R60 per day? It’s 
crazy and I don’t think that it is worth my effort, 
although I am unemployed.46  
Women were seen as more willing to put their 
‘pride’ to one side, in the interests of supporting 
their families.
Men do not want to be seen doing that in most 
cases. They think that if I am going to go to 
the street and do that thing, I might be seen 
as being down and out. But he cannot bring 
any income to the house. What I can tell you is 
that I have seen that women do not have pride 
because they want their kids to eat. But men do 
not care. I can tell you – that is why they say a 
woman holds a knife at its sharpest point. That 
is what those women are doing at the ground.47 
One body of work that may shed light on this 
phenomenon focuses on young men’s apparent 
need to position themselves ‘within gender and 
age hierarchies’ in order to achieve recognition as 
men.48 This dominant (or ‘hegemonic’) model of 
masculinity for working class black South Africans 
is ‘underpinned by male economic provision’.49 
Though young men identify with this expression of 
masculinity, they are prevented from achieving this 
status due to the limited economic opportunities 
available to them, leaving them ‘socially positioned as 
children’. As a reaction to this, and in order to be able 
to position themselves as men (in their own eyes and 
the eyes of others) they invest in a ‘particular youth 
masculinity’ in which their ability to secure respect is 
achieved ‘through violence against partners, control 
of partners, seeking multiple sexual partners, and 
violence against other men’.50 The corollary of this is 
that some of those men, younger and older, who do 
participate in the CWP may not identify so strongly 
with these ideas about masculinity, and have personal 
identities that are ‘maintained independently of peer 
recognition or affirmation’.51  
Implications for the status of women 
and men in poor communities 
Since women are generally recognised as the 
‘primary caregiver’ of their children, 96% of 
recipients52 of the child support grant are women, 
with 11 655 042 monthly grants distributed in 
February 2015.53 Research evidence indicates that 
most recipients of the grant use this income either for 
the benefit of their overall families or very specifically 
for their children.54 Whether they are recipients of the 
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CSG or not, it is likely that many female participants 
in the CWP use their incomes in a similar way. One 
impact of the CWP may be that it enables women to 
play the role of ‘provider’ in their households.  
Due to the fact that they are generally not recipients 
of the CSG, or any other grant, most unemployed 
men fall outside of the safety net provided by the 
system of social grants. The irony then is that 
many men seem to exclude themselves from the 
CWP, in part because participation in the CWP is 
seen to adversely impact on their ability to achieve 
or maintain the status of being men. This in turn 
reinforces their disempowered and marginal position. 
Arguably, therefore, a major impact of CWP wages 
is to further consolidate the dynamic, created by the 
CSG, in which women are able to play the role of 
economic providers, while men’s position of exclusion 
remains largely unaffected. 
The impact of stable household 
income on childhood risk factors  
As has been established above, participants in the 
CWP, most of whom are women, receive incomes 
which, while relatively low, are nevertheless ‘regular 
and predictable’.55 CWP wages supplement 
household incomes and, particularly where combined 
with the CSG or other social grants, enable women 
in poor communities to better provide for their 
children. This suggests that the most significant crime 
prevention impact of CWP wages may be in reducing 
childhood risk factors for involvement in crime and 
violence, through:
•	 Reducing	the	economic	uncertainty,	and	thus	the	
emotional stress, that poor families are subjected 
to. Both poverty and economic instability may 
contribute to emotional stress.56 Though the 
CWP does not reverse the effects of poverty, 
it creates a modicum of economic stability. By 
reducing economic stress, CWP wages may also 
reduce levels of emotional distress, with positive 
implications for parental efficacy.57
•	 Enabling	mothers	or	parents	to	maintain	a	relatively	
high level of supervision over their children, 
since they live and work in the same community. 
They might not be able to ‘keep an eye’ on their 
children while at work, but it means that the time 
they spend away from home is not extended by 
travelling. ‘Poor parental supervision is usually 
the strongest and most replicable predictor of 
offending’,58 while parental support has been found 
to protect against such behaviour.59 
•	Getting	CWP	participants	to	work	alongside	other	
community members. This increases their range of 
social ties with people within their communities,60  
and is likely to increase their access to, and ability 
to mobilise, social support through their links with 
people in similar circumstances (social capital). The 
access that people have to family and other social 
networks of support may have positive implications 
for child-rearing, although this will depend on the 
quality of these relationships.61
Unemployment ‘leads to a lack of structure in 
people’s lives, and to isolation and exclusion from the 
wider community’.62 Thus, whether from the wages 
earned, participation in work, or a combination of 
the two, it appears likely that participation in the 
CWP has economic as well as social and emotional 
benefits for many participants63 and that these may 
translate into benefits for their dependants.
The argument that CWP wages, and other benefits 
of participating in the CWP, will contribute to a 
reduction in some of the childhood risk factors for 
crime and violence, therefore makes good sense. 
However, this argument also needs to take account 
of the impact of CWP wages on gender power 
relations in poor households. 
Intimate partner violence
There is extensive international literature on the 
relationship between women’s employment (and 
economic empowerment generally), and the risk 
of domestic violence. Some authors suggest that 
increases in women’s income (or other resources), 
particularly where this exceeds the income or 
resources of their male partners, will increase their 
risk of victimisation, since they are seen to threaten 
the status of their male partners.64 Others propose 
that ‘increasing women’s economic resources 
empowers her to bargain for a better situation for 
herself, or to leave, therefore reducing her risk of 
abuse.’65 Studies on how women’s access to an 
independent income affects their risk of intimate 
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partner violence (IPV) have provided mixed results.66  
Women’s empowerment, or situations where a 
woman’s income exceeds that of her partner, do 
not necessarily predict an increased risk of violence. 
However, another study suggests that when a 
woman’s economic situation improves, it might lead 
to abuse and the dissolution of the relationship, 
which would then account for the fact that there is 
no increase in violence in the long term.67
Nevertheless, some of the literature does indicate 
that when women work while their male partners 
are unemployed, the risk of violence to the female 
partner increases.68 As has been argued above, the 
CWP reinforces female economic empowerment 
while unemployed men maintain their disempowered 
position, and are thus increasingly disadvantaged 
relative to women. This takes place within a 
culture in which many men are invested in a ‘youth 
masculinity’ that includes the use of violence against 
women as part of its repertoire for being recognised 
as men.69 The nett effect may be to increase the 
risk of violence women face from unemployed 
male partners, and more generally, to leave intact a 
situation of male dysfunctionality.     
The potentially beneficial impact of CWP wages in 
providing more stable incomes for poor households 
therefore needs to be juxtaposed against the 
possibility that the CWP, as it is currently operating, 
may exacerbate the risk of domestic violence and 
conflict in the home.70 Intimate partner violence (IPV) 
does not only adversely affect its immediate victims. 
Children who witness or are otherwise exposed to 
it have a higher likelihood of various ‘behavioural, 
emotional and social problems’, including ‘higher 
levels of aggression’, and are likely to show 
‘increased tolerance for and use of violence in adult 
relationships’ later in life.71 Some CWP sites have 
in fact taken on the task of confronting domestic 
violence through awareness campaigns72 and 
support to victims of domestic violence.73 It may, 
however, be beneficial to provide additional forms of 
support to female participants, particularly if they are 
identified as being at risk of intimate partner violence, 
to enable the CWP to become more supportive of 
‘primary level crime prevention’. 
One programme that has produced positive results 
in reducing intimate partner violence in South Africa 
is the Intervention with Microfinance for AIDS and 
Gender Equity (IMAGE). In addition to providing 
microfinance to female participants, the intervention 
also offers women participants training sessions that 
cover gender roles, cultural beliefs, relationships, 
communication, domestic violence, and HIV infection. 
Qualitative data suggests that the reductions in 
intimate partner violence achieved by the programme 
resulted from a range of responses, including 
‘enabl[ing] women to challenge the acceptability of 
such violence, expect and receive better treatment 
from partners, leave violent relationships and give 
material and moral support to those experiencing 
abuse’.74 This suggests that providing similar training 
to female participants in the CWP may assist in 
reducing their vulnerability to intimate partner 
violence. This may not only assist them personally, 
but reinforce the impact of CWP wages in helping 
parents to maintain family environments that are more 
supportive of primary crime prevention. 
Involvement of young men 
in crime and violence 
Research shows that greater employment does 
reduce levels of crime, particularly property crime. 
But it is primarily by increasing the employment of 
young men, particularly those who are ‘low skilled’, 
that levels of property crime are reduced.75 This might 
imply that the CWP’s capacity to have an impact on 
crime is dependent on the participation of young men 
in the programme. However, it cannot be assumed 
that increasing the number of young men in the CWP, 
on its own, would have significant crime reduction 
benefits. This is because participation in crime is 
influenced not only by the levels of employment of 
‘low-skilled’ young men, but also by the value of 
wages.76 The wages paid in the CWP are relatively 
low. As a result, the employment of young men in the 
CWP may not stop those who are involved in crime 
from continuing their criminal activity. 
It is believed that another benefit of employment is 
that it builds social bonds and can thereby strengthen 
informal social control that serves as a deterrent to 
participation in crime.77 However, higher paying jobs 
not only reduce financial motives to commit (property) 
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crime, but may also be more likely to strengthen 
pro-social bonds.78 The social bonds formed in 
employment are not inevitably pro-social in nature, 
and this may apply to a greater degree to low-wage, 
low-quality jobs.79 In so far as the bonds formed at 
work are primarily with other low-skilled young men, 
these bonds may actually facilitate participation in 
violence and crime.  
Thus, attracting more young men into the CWP, 
on its own, may not be sufficient to discourage 
participation in crime. It may also be necessary for 
those in the CWP to address questions about how 
best to work with the notion of ‘masculinity’.80 The 
young men who are already in the CWP may not 
identify strongly with violent youth masculinities. One 
way to encourage the participation of young men 
within the CWP may be to affirm these kinds of male 
identities. However, this is unlikely to attract young 
men who are invested in violent youth masculinities 
into the CWP. It may be necessary to find ways of 
working with these young men in a manner that 
is compatible with their underlying sense of what 
it means to be a man, but without reinforcing the 
violent aspects of their identities. 
Conclusion: strengthening the impact 
of CWP wages on crime and violence
The CWP was not established to reduce or prevent 
crime. And although crime and violence prevention 
is an important social objective, it is not intrinsically 
more important than providing an income safety net 
to unemployed people.81  
Nevertheless, since the CWP may contribute to 
reducing crime and violence, it is important to 
consider how it might do so. This article argues that 
one mechanism through which the CWP is likely to 
contribute to crime prevention is through supporting 
mothers in creating more stable and nurturing home 
environments. This needs to be balanced against 
the possible increased risk of IPV resulting from the 
impact of CWP wages on gender power relations in 
the home. One way in which the crime and violence 
prevention benefits of CWP work and wages may 
be increased is by combining the programmes 
with ‘gender training’, similar to that offered in the 
IMAGE programme, to help women more effectively 
negotiate their status as the main economic providers 
in their homes.  
Still, the low levels of male participation in the CWP 
will have to be addressed if the CWP is to promote 
community development in a holistic way. Even 
though it seems that men have chosen to exclude 
themselves from the CWP, structural marginalisation 
of young men, and men more generally, typically 
translates into adverse behaviour that has 
disadvantages for women and communities. As a 
result, the community development objectives of the 
CWP can probably better be promoted by including 
men and women, old and young, more equally within 
the programme.
These conclusions point to the need for organisations 
involved in crime and violence prevention, including 
the prevention of gender-based violence, and youth 
development organisations to partner with and 
support the CWP in achieving its crime and violence 
prevention potential.
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